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I. DEFAMATION
WHAT IF THE PRODUCT Is BAD?
Turbochargers are serious business, and the respective merits of differ-
ent makes and models are fiercely debated in the turbocharger commu-
nity. So it happened in David Rafes, Inc. v. Huml,l where plaintiff Rafes
claimed that Huml and Slowboy Racing, Inc., published defamations
about Rafes and the quality of Rafes's turbocharger over the Internet.
Rafes claimed Huml and Slowboy had said that "Rafes's turbocharger
was a 'poorly manufactured turbo from China' that would 'inevitably fail
in a short amount of time,"' was "'a Chinese version us[ing] an inferior
stainless in its composition,"' and "was composed of metal, or, 'some type
of powdered metal,' that would 'not hold up to the heat and abuse." 2
Rafes also claimed that the pictures published with the article actually
showed a turbocharger made by someone else, and that Huml and
Slowboy had implied that Rafes's turbocharger had been scientifically
tested, when in fact it had not.3
The trial court indicated some uncertainty about "the law of business
disparagement" and damages for libel, but it may have been simply cut-
ting to the point at the conclusion of a bench trial when it issued "'prelim-
inary' findings" to the effect that there was indeed something wrong with
Rafes's turbocharger, as Rafes's "witnesses or witness" had conceded-
"just not anything that Mr. Huml or that the defendants said was wrong
with it." 4 The trial court observed that whether or not Rafes had been
slandered, the turbocharger was evidently a "bad product" whose manu-
facturing problems would have cut deeply into Rafes's damages in any
event.5 When the plaintiff's counsel questioned whether there was really
any evidence that its product was a "bad product," the trial court an-
swered, "Well, it is there. Trust me." 6
On appeal, the Houston First Court of Appeals noted that "substantial
1. No. 01-08-00856-cv, 2009 WL 3491043 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 29,
2009, no pet.).
2. Id. at *1 (alterations in original).
3. Id.
4. Id. at *2. Statutory libel is governed by chapter 73 of the Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code, though common law defenses are maintained under section 73.006. Business (or
"commercial") disparagement requires proof of publication of a falsity, malice, and special
damages. Hurlbut v. Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex. 1987).




truth" is sufficient to defeat a libel claim.7 The court explained that the
accused statement need not be "literally true in every detail; substantial
truth is sufficient."8 The court of appeals added that in order to deter-
mine if the allegedly defamatory statement is "substantially true," the
question to ask is whether it was "more damaging to the plaintiff's repu-
tation, in the mind of the average person, than a truthful statement would
have been." 9
The trial court did not enter explicit and final findings or conclusions,
but the court of appeals read the trial court's judgment as "impl[ying] all
findings of fact necessary to support it,"' 0 and expressly noted that among
these implied findings was an affirmative defense of substantial truth."
And, indeed, the court of appeals found sufficient evidence to support
what it described as the trial court's "blunt[] summar[y]" that the plain-
tiff's turbocharger was a "bad product."12 The court described at length
the testimony of the defendants' expert on the subject matter of turbo-
chargers, who testified that he had "serious concerns" about "every part"
of the plaintiff's turbocharger, mostly "for the same reasons" as the de-
fendants had observed, and indeed even more concerns about the prod-
uct than the defendants had identified in their article.13 Not surprisingly,
Rafes had its own expert who defended the plaintiff's product and dis-
puted the claims of his counterpart on the other side, but, significantly,
the court of appeals accepted the trial court "as the sole judge of the
credibility of the witnesses" and therefore "entitled to accept or reject all
or any part of the [dueling experts'] testimony." 14
In these circumstances, it probably would not matter much whether the
action was brought as a libel or slander case, as a commercial disparage-
ment case, or even a case under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.' 5 Nor,
perhaps, might it have mattered how clearly the defendants had pled
their affirmative defenses. If the fact finder finds the plaintiff makes a
"bad product," the defendant can say so, and can say it bluntly and with
impunity. In the spirit of what Garry Trudeau once said, this may be an
example of "free speech at its most bracing."16
7. Id. at *4.
8. Id. (citing Gustafson v. City of Austin, 110 S.W.3d 652, 656 (Tex. App.-Austin
2003, pet. denied); Howell v. Hecht, 821 S.W.2d 627, 631-32 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ
denied)).
9. Id.
10. Id. at *2-3
11. Id. at *4 n.3, *7.
12. Id. at *5.
13. Id. at *5-6.
14. Id. at *6.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
16. See Cartoonist Trudeau Foresees Protest, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 10, 1983, at




FRAUD AND THE MERGER CLAUSE
As a matter of routine, written agreements often say that they contain
within them the entirety of the parties' agreement, superseding all earlier
discussions, understandings, and agreements, and that there are no other
agreements or commitments between the parties except the written ones
in the document being signed. These are commonly called "merger"
clauses because they seek to "merge" all previous and concurrent discus-
sions between parties into one document in hopes of reducing the risk of
surprises later on.
Questions of fraud, particularly fraudulent inducement, sometimes
complicate this analysis. This occurred in LJ Charter, L.L.C. v. Air
America Jet Charter, Inc.,17 in which the jury found that one air charter
company committed common-law fraud against another one in connec-
tion with the lease of an aircraft hangar at Hobby Airport.' 8 On appeal,
one issue involved whether the merger clause in the parties' agreement
precluded the plaintiff's claims for common-law fraud.19
The merger clause in the agreement provided: "This Agreement consti-
tutes the entire agreement of the parties hereto and supercedes any prior
understandings or written or oral agreements between the parties re-
specting the subject matter hereof, and may only be modified in writing
executed by all of the parties hereto."20 Citing Ikon Office Solutions, Inc.
v. Eifert,21 the defendant urged that the merger clause must preclude any
reasonable reliance by the plaintiff on any commitments outside the
terms of the contract-for according to this clause, there were none.22
The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals distinguished Eifert, how-
ever, finding that the merger clause in the Eifert employment agreement
included additional language besides what the court described as the
"standard merger clause language." 23 This additional language provided
that "[njo commitments have been made relative to bonuses, guarantees
or any other special provisions, except as specifically identified herein." 24
The court of appeals concluded that the expanded merger clause in Eifert
distinguished it from the one in this case, because bonuses and the like
were part of what was at issue in Eifert. "[U]nlike the merger clause in
Eifert," the court explained, "the merger clause [here] does not contain a
specific clause disclaiming reliance on representations concerning matters
17. No. 14-08-00534-CV, 2009 WL 4794242 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 15,
2009, pet. filed).
18. Id. at *5.
19. Id. at *11.
20. Id.
21. 125 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
22. Among other elements, a plaintiff in a common-law fraud action must show that
the defendant made a false representation intending that the other party rely on it, and
that the other party did rely on it. LJ Charter, 2009 WL 4794242, at *11.
23. Id. at *11-12.
24. Id. at *11.
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in dispute in this litigation."25 The court did realize that a merger clause
"that clearly expresses the parties' intent to waive fraudulent inducement
claims, or one that disclaims reliance on representations about specific
matters in dispute, can preclude a claim of fraudulent inducement,"26 but
it held that the merger clause in LI Charter was not sufficient in that
respect. 27
It may not be practicable, or even possible, to anticipate and address
every imaginable representation about specific matters that might later
come into dispute, and to specifically disclaim reliance on them, but
clearly expressing an intent to waive fraudulent inducement claims may
be advisable in some circumstances.
III. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
A. BECOMING THE MIDDLEMAN
Auditorium chairs may be sold through multiple levels. Manufacturers
will sell to distributors, distributors will sell downstream to dealers, and
dealers will then sell to end-user customers. Distributors and dealers may
each offer their own warranties and other value commitments, and they
typically operate on nonexclusive arrangements. In this highly competi-
tive environment, these arrangements can often lead to disputes, as hap-
pened in Smith v. Royal Seating, Ltd.2 8
Royal Seating was a nonexclusive distributor of a certain type of audi-
torium chair made in Mexico. Royal Seating would buy chairs from the
manufacturer and resell them to dealers, such as Rock Systems, who
would then sell the chairs to consumers. 29
In 2006, Royal Seating, acting as the distributor, and Rock Systems, the
dealer, were negotiating with three churches in California who joined to-
gether to buy 8,700 chairs and installation services. Representatives from
both distributor Royal Seating and dealer Rock Systems were involved in
these negotiations. Eventually, dealer Rock Systems bought the chairs
and sold them to the churches, but it did not buy them from distributor
Royal Seating. Instead, it formed its own new company, Lone Star Seat-
ing, to act as its own distributor. 30 Distributor Royal Seating brought suit
for tortious interference with a prospective contract, claiming it would
have sold the seats to the churches (presumably through dealer Rock Sys-
tems) if the defendants had not intentionally interfered and shoved Royal
Seating aside. After a bench trial, the trial court agreed, and entered
judgment in favor of plaintiff-distributor Royal Seating.31
25. Id. at *12.
26. Id. at *11 (quoting Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 181
(Tex. 1997)).
27. Id. at *12.
28. No. 03-09-00114-CV, 2009 WL 3682644 (Tex. App.-Austin, Nov. 6, 2009, no pet.).
29. Id. at *1.
30. Lone Star Seating was formed by Bobby J. Smith, principal of dealer Rock Sys-
tems, at the end of 2006. Id. at *1.
31. Id. at *1-2.
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The issues on appeal focused on a fact-intensive study of the evidence,
measured against the elements of tortious interference with prospective
business relationships. The Austin Court of Appeals outlined those ele-
ments as follows:
To establish tortious interference with a prospective business rela-
tionship, a plaintiff must prove (i) a reasonable probability that the
plaintiff would have entered into a business relationship; (ii) an inde-
pendently tortious or unlawful act by the defendant that prevented
the relationship from occurring; (iii) the defendant did such act with
a conscious desire to prevent the relationship from occurring or the
defendant knew the interference was certain or substantially certain
to occur as a result of the conduct; and (iv) the plaintiff suffered
actual harm or damages as a result of the defendant's interference. 32
The court of appeals noted that plaintiffs are not required to show a lack
of justification or privilege for the defendant's action.33
The court examined evidence relating to each of these elements and
concluded that it was legally and factually sufficient.34 Much discussion
revolved around whether there was a reasonable probability that Royal
Seating would have entered into a business relationship.35 The court
noted testimony that the churches wanted a warranty that ran from Royal
Seating, quoting testimony from one witness that "[t]he determining fac-
tor with [one of the churches] was the lengthy warranty [from Royal Seat-
ing]." 36 There was also a check made payable to "Rock Systems Group/
Royal Seating, Ltd." from one of the churches, a purchase order and an
"AIA document" between that church and "Rock Systems Group/Royal
Seating Ltd." and a "purchase agreement" from another of the churches
that was entitled "Rock Systems Group/Royal Seating, Ltd." The court
of appeals concluded from all of this "that the evidence was legally and
factually sufficient to support the district court's finding" of "a reasonable
probability that Royal Seating and the churches would have entered into
a business relationship."3 7 Similarly, the court of appeals found sufficient
evidence of a "conscious desire to prevent the business relationship be-
tween the churches and Royal Seating from occurring," since Rock Sys-
tems' principal had intentionally substituted his own new company as the
distributor in the deal.38
Unlike the cause of action for tortious interference with existing con-
tracts, tortious interference with prospective contracts or prospective bus-
iness relationships requires a showing that the act alleged to constitute an
interference be itself "independently tortious or otherwise wrongful" in
32. Id. at *3 n.6 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 726 (Tex.
2001)).
33. Id. at *3 n.7 (citing Wal-Mart, 52 S.W.3d at 726-27).
34. Id. at *3-9.
35. Id. at *3-5.
36. Id. at *4-5.
37. Id. at *5.
38. Id. at *6.
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and of itself, separate and apart from the fact that it causes an interfer-
ence.39 The court of appeals noted the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges
standard for "independently tortious" conduct, and addressed whether
there was legally and factually sufficient evidence of that conduct in this
record. 40 Royal Seating claimed Rock Systems had committed two such
independent torts-fraud and conversion-through its conversion of a
check from one of the churches made payable to "Rock Systems Group/
Royal Seating, Ltd." which Rock Systems deposited into its own account
without telling Royal Seating.41 The court of appeals quoted lengthy tes-
timony from the trial record, concluding it was legally and factually suffi-
cient to support a finding that the acts were independently tortious and
unlawful. 42 The court of appeals focused on the claim of conversion
"[b]ecause it is dispositive" 43 and did not reach Royal Seating's claim that
Rock Systems had also committed fraud "by not disclosing that they
planned to divert the sales to the churches from Royal Seating to them-
selves and that they were secretly negotiating with [the manufacturer] to
accomplish this result." 44
This was a two-to-one opinion, however, issued over a strong dissent.
The dissent viewed the majority as showing "unwarranted and improper
deference to the trial court [in affirming] the trial court's erroneous judg-
ment."45 In the dissent's view, "Royal Seating did not produce legally
sufficient evidence to support" either "a reasonable probability that [it]
would have entered into a business relationship with the churches or that
Rock Systems's conduct was independently tortious or wrongful." 46 In-
stead, the dissent characterized Royal Seating's evidence as "vague and
uncertain" 47 on some points and entirely lacking on others.48 By contrast,
the dissent found "clear, positive, and direct testimony" from Rock Sys-
tems that the first contact from the churches came through it, rather than
through Royal Seating. 49 The dissent also found that Royal Seating was
never able to show that the churches "had made a final decision" to buy
chairs from Royal Seating through Rock Systems.50 "At most," said the
dissent, the evidence showed that one Lazarian, "whose authority was
never defined or explained, indicated at one point that he planned to buy
39. Id. at *3 n.6, *7.
40. Id. "By independently tortious we do not mean that the plaintiff must be able to
prove an independent tort. Rather, we mean only that the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's conduct would be actionable under a recognized tort." Id. at *7 (quoting Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 726 (Tex. 2001)). See id. at *7-8 (reviewing the
evidence).
41. Id. at *6, 7.
42. Id. at *6-8.
43. Id. at *6.
44. Id. at *6 n.12.
45. Id. at *9.
46. Id.
47. Id. at *11.
48. Id. at *11-12.





In particular, the dissent urged that there was insufficient evidence of a
reasonable probability that Royal Seating would have gotten the busi-
ness, because there was no evidence that the churches did not simply
change their minds at the last minute-as the dissent noted they were
perfectly free to do. "A customer is entitled to solicit bids and conduct
in-depth negotiations right up until the moment it enters into a con-
tract. . . . [And it may change] its mind at the last minute."52 The dis-
sent found no fraud because Royal Seating had not shown any duty on
Rock Systems' part to disclose its plans.53 The dissent also found no evi-
dence of conversion because Royal Seating did not have any ownership
or possession rights to the check, and "[the church's] mistaken use of
Royal Seating's name on the check does not give Royal Seating a right to
possession of the money." 54
Tortious interference cases are, heavily fact intensive, which implies
that, on appeal, there should be great deference shown to the fact finder.
On appeal from this bench trial, the majority held that the trial court is
the "'sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be
given their testimony' . . . [and] may believe one witness, disbelieve
others, and resolve inconsistencies in any witness's testimony."55 The dis-
sent, by contrast, urged that "in considering the sufficiency of the evi-
dence, we must also be mindful that in some cases, certain evidence may
not be credited just as other evidence may not be disregarded by a rea-
sonable fact-finder." 56 The tension between these two principles may be
resolved elsewhere. Meanwhile, cutting out the middleman by becoming
the middleman proved unsuccessful for this appellant.
B. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LIVES
Zoning restrictions often restrict fireworks operators on where they
can sell. In City of Houston v. Guthrie,57 a group of fireworks operators
and property owners located outside the city limits of Houston, but inside
certain Harris County municipal utility districts (MUDs), challenged the
use by Houston and the MUDs of "certain strategic partnership agree-
ments and the Houston City Fire Code" to ban the sale of fireworks
where they were located.58 Among other claims, the fireworks operators
and property owners claimed that these actions constituted a tortious in-
terference (presumably with the fireworks operators' prospective rela-
tionships with their customers, and with the property owners' lease
51. Id.
52. Id. at *12.
53. Id. at *13.
54. Id. at *14.
55. Id. at *3 (citing McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696-97 (Tex. 1986)).
56. Id. at *10 (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2005)).
57. No. 01-08-00712-CV, 2009 WL 5174258 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 31,
2009, no pet. h.).
58. Id. at *1.
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agreements with the fireworks operators, though the opinion was not spe-
cific on this point).59 The City and the MUDs urged that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to consider this claim, however, because tortious inter-
ference would not fall within a valid legislative waiver of the City's and
the MUDs' sovereign immunity from suit under the Texas Torts Claims
Act.60
The Houston First Court of Appeals quickly agreed with the City and
the MUDs because the Texas Tort Claims Act-which does provide "a
limited waiver of immunity for certain tort claims against governmental
entities and caps recoverable damages"-does not waive immunity for
intentional torts.61 Tortious interference, of course, is an intentional
tort.62
C. How LONG MAY THIs Acriviy Go ON?
"Equity aids the vigilant," and the equitable defense of laches may
arise if a plaintiff waits too long before seeking a temporary injunction.
This was among the issues raised in Frequent Flyer Depot, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc. 6 3
Frequent Flyer was a broker of airline frequent flyer miles and awards,
including the AAdvantagem rewards points issued by American Airlines.
American objected to this practice and brought claims "for tortious inter-
ference with contract, tortious interference with prospective relations,
misappropriation, and fraud," as well as a breach-of-contract claim
against one of Frequent Flyer's principals.64 The trial court granted "a
temporary injunction prohibiting [Frequent Flyer] from buying, selling,
bartering, or soliciting AAdvantagem rewards [pending trial]." 65
One issue on appeal was whether the injunction was really preserving
the status quo, or instead was changing it. The defendants claimed to
have been in business since 2002, and claimed that American had known
what they were doing since then, in fact an American Airlines attorney
had called the defendants' principal "several times" in 2002 about domain
names connected to frequentflyerdepot.com, contending the domain
names constituted a trademark infringement. Also, "[s]ince 2005, Ameri-
can ha[d] stopped travel on tickets [brokered through] Frequent Flyer by
freezing the accounts of AAdvantagem members" who sold their miles to
third parties.66 Frequent Flyer urged that by 2008, the "last peaceable
uncontested status" would be for them to carry on in their business.67
59. Id. at *1-2.
60. Id. at *10.
61. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.023, 101.057(2) (Vernon
2005)).
62. Id. (citing Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 795-96 (Tex. 1995)).
63. 281 S.W.3d 215, 229 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied).
64. Id. at 220.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 222.
67. Id. at 223.
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American obviously disagreed, contending there was no evidence Ameri-
can knew of Frequent Flyer's brokering activities in 2002 when it con-
tacted Frequent Flyer about the latter's 136 domain names, and no
evidence that it knew in 2005 and later that the accounts it was freezing
were sold through Frequent Flyer in particular. Further, it claimed it
could not have known the full extent of what Frequent Flyer was doing,
because Frequent Flyer admitted its transactions were "caught" "only be-
tween three to ten percent of the time." 68 Frequent Flyer's principals
testified that it instructed its customers to tell American that the points
were a "gift" and that "such representations [were] lies." 69
In the view of the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, the "last peaceable,
noncontested status" would be for Frequent Flyer to stop selling AAd-
vantage"m rewards points "[i]f, as American claims, appellants' activities
are in violation of its agreement with AAdvantagem members."70 Since
there was no challenge on appeal as to whether American had "proved a
probable right to recover on its causes of action,"71 this appeared to be
the case. But the court of appeals went on to note that American had
moved for a temporary injunction "when it learned the full extent of Fre-
quent Flyer's activities" which Frequent Flyer was continuing despite
American's objections.72 The fact that Frequent Flyer was affirmatively
concealing its activity appears to have been very significant, as the court
of appeals wrote that "American should not be denied [an injunction] to
which it is otherwise entitled simply because it took some time for it to
discover Frequent Flyer's admittedly concealed activity."73
The court of appeals did not specifically address many of the elements
of the causes of action involved, or why "between three to ten percent" of
the defendant's activity-which was being captured, apparently over a
period of years, and of which some (though not all) may have been
known or readily knowable to have come through Frequent Flyer-was
not itself sufficient to trigger an equitable obligation upon American to
move against the defendants more promptly.7 4 It may be, however, that
where the defendants have been admittedly concealing their activities,
and instructing their customers to misrepresent the facts to American, the
defendants themselves were simply estopped to make that claim, though
that was not expressly stated in the opinion.?5
68. Id. at 222-23.
69. Id. at 223 n.3.
70. Id. at 223.
71. Id. at 223 n.2.
72. Id. at 223.
73. Id.
74. See id.




A. WILL UNCLEAN HANDS BAR ENFORCEABILITY?
The relationship between noncompetition agreements and unclean
hands was raised, but ducked, in Central Texas Orthopedic Products, Inc.
v. Espinoza.76 Espinoza had served Central Texas Orthopedics as a sales
rep for four years when he resigned to take a sales job with its competi-
tor, Stryker Orthopedics.77 Central Texas promptly sued to enforce Espi-
noza's one-year post-termination noncompetition covenant, and claimed
breach of a compensation agreement (for not returning $485 that Espi-
noza owed) and breach of fiduciary duty, as well as tortious interference
by Stryker. Espinoza counterclaimed for $12,000 he claimed to be owed
in commissions and particularly claimed that Central Texas's withholding
of these commissions constituted "unclean hands," precluding equitable
enforcement of the noncompetition covenant. 78
The Covenants Not to Compete Act 7 9 does not specifically address the
clean hands doctrine, but it does provide that "[t]he criteria for enforce-
ability [of a noncompetition covenant] and the procedures and remedies
in an action to enforce [one] are exclusive and preempt any other criteria
for enforceability ... or procedures and remedies ... under common law
or otherwise."80 Central Texas argued that as a common law principle,
the clean hands doctrine is expressly preempted by the Act.8 ' Espinoza
disagreed, urging that the clean hands doctrine is an equitable principle,
and that the preemptive provision in the Act would not apply.8 2
The San Antonio Court of Appeals recognized but sidestepped the
question, holding that it needed not decide whether the statute preempts
the unclean hands doctrine, because the action Espinoza claimed consti-
tuted unclean hands was not sufficient in any event.8 3 The court of ap-
peals held that the unclean hands doctrine would not apply unless "the
misconduct at issue is connected to the subject of the litigation and the
party asserting the defense has been seriously harmed by the miscon-
duct." 84 The court of appeals held that the doctrine did not apply in this
case because the alleged bad acts-failure to pay the commissions due-
did not arise from any obligations in the non-compete agreement, but
rather from a compensation agreement, which was different. 5 These ob-
ligations were separate, and the court of appeals held that "the doctrine
of unclean hands does not apply when a party is guilty of inequitable
76. No. 04-09-00148-CV, 2009 WL 4670446 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Dec. 9, 2009,
pet. filed); see also infra Part V.A.
77. Id. at *1.
78. Id. at *1-2.
79. TEx. Bus. COM. CODE ANN. § 15.52 (Vernon 2002).
80. Id.
81. Espinoza, 2009 WL 4670446, at *2.






conduct with regard to a transaction separate from the one in dispute."86
Since Espinoza did not establish that his former employer had acted with
unclean hands, the trial court's summary judgment in Espinoza's favor on
that point was reversed.87
Determination of whether the equitable doctrine of unclean hands is
really preempted by section 15.52 of the Covenants Not to Compete Act
must await a case which presents unclean hands arising out of those obli-
gations directly.
B. STOCK OPTIONS AND "GIVING RISE" TO THE NEED FOR A
COVENANT
It is well known that to be enforceable, covenants not to compete must
be "ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement at the time
the agreement is made" and contain reasonable limitations that "do not
impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or
other business interest of the promisee."88 It is also understood that to be
"ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement," the "consid-
eration given by the employer in the otherwise enforceable agreement
must give rise to the employer's interest in restraining the employee from
competing[, and] the covenant must be designed to enforce the em-
ployee's consideration or return promise in the otherwise enforceable
agreement."89
"Giving rise" to an employer's interest in a noncompetition covenant
was the subject of Marsh USA, Inc. v. Cook.90 Here, defendant Cook was
a managing director for Marsh and had worked for the company since
1983. He was included in the 1992 Employee Incentive and Stock Award
Plan and was granted stock options in 1996. Before exercising them,
however, he had to sign a non-solicitation agreement which contained a
covenant not to compete. Cook signed the agreement in 2005 and exer-
cised the stock options, but he left Marsh in 2007 and went to work for
one of its competitors. When Marsh sued to enforce the noncompetition
covenant, Cook claimed it was unenforceable because it was signed in
return for stock options, and stock options in and of themselves did not
"give rise" to the need for a noncompetition covenant from him.91
Marsh urged that "offering a stock option to a valuable employee" like
Cook "gives rise to its interest in protecting its goodwill." 92 The Dallas
Court of Appeals disagreed, however, noting that Marsh "was trying to
protect its goodwill by offering the stock options to certain valued em-
86. Id.
87. Id. at *4.
88. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
89. Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 648-49 (Tex.
2006).
90. 287 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. granted).
91. Id. at 378-80.
92. Id. at 380.
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ployees, including Cook," 93 but that it did not follow that such a stock
plan incentive "gives rise to an employer's interest in restraining the em-
ployee from competing." 94 Instead, relying on Olander v. Compass
Bank,95 the court of appeals held that "[tihe give rise requirement may be
met only if the consideration given by the company creates the interest in
restraining competition" and that this would occur only if that interest did
not exist before the consideration was extended.96 Since Marsh's interest
in Cook's not competing did not arise or change when it awarded the
stock to Cook, the award did not "give rise" to the need or interest in the
noncompetition agreement, and consequently the noncompetition agree-
ment could not be enforced.97
Note that, as the court of appeals observed, the Texas test for consider-
ation to be provided by the employer is "significantly [more] burden-
some" than the test in some other states.98 For example, in Indiana, the
test would be "whether the covenant and contract have a significant
nexus to the 'employment situation,"' even though these rights "do not
arise from the contract to which the covenant is attached." 99 Texas re-
quires exactly that.100
C. TRADEMARKs Do NOT RESTRICT COMPETITION
In RE/MAX International Inc. v. TrendSetter Realty, LLC,101 the main
issue involved a trademark infringement claim by RE/MAX against a real
estate brokerage whose trademarked logo involved a rectangular design
with red, white, and blue horizontal stripes. The defendant was ordered
to cancel its use of the logo because it stood to be confused with the
trademarked logo of RE/MAX.102
The brokerage agreement contained a post-termination provision that
prevented the brokerage from using RE/MAX's trademarks, among
other things. The defendant argued that the provision amounted to a
noncompetition covenant and that it was unreasonable in scope, duration,
and geographical reach and thus unenforceable. 0 3 In assessing whether
the post-termination provision of the contract constituted a "non-com-
pete" covenant, the district court recognized the Fifth Circuit's holding in
Guy Carpenter & Co., Inc. v. Provenzale104 that "a provision need not
93. Id.
94. Id. at 380-81.
95. 172 F. Supp. 2d 846 (S.D. Tex. 2001), affd, 44 F. App'x 651 (5th Cir. 2002).
96. Marsh USA, 287 S.W.3d at 381.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 380.
99. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Field v. Alexander & Alexander of Ind., Inc., 503
N.E.2d 627, 632 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)).
100. Id. at 380.
101. 655 F. Supp. 2d 679 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
102. Id. at 711.
103. Id. at 718.
104. 334 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2003).
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'expressly prohibit' competition to come within its reach."105 Quoting
the Fifth Circuit, the district court stated, "It is enough that the 'practical
and economic reality of such a provision is that it inhibits competition
virtually the same as a covenant not to compete."' 10 6 The district court
went on to point out, however, that "Texas law does not treat nondisclo-
sure agreements as covenants not to compete."107 "A nondisclosure
agreement does not prevent [the] former employee from competing,"
only from using trade secrets or confidential information to compete.108
Addressing the provision at issue in the RE/MAX contract, the district
court said it was "largely a nondisclosure agreement . . . preventing for-
mer agents from disclosing or using . .. trademarks, confidential informa-
tion, or trade secrets, which RE/MAX [was] entitled to protect." 109 The
provision prohibiting the former broker from competing using a red,
white, and blue sign that could be confusingly similar to RE/MAX marks
did not amount to a restriction on competition, because the trademark "is
not essential to succeeding in the real estate business.""i0
D. ARE NONSOLICITATION COVENANTS GOVERNED AS NON-
COMPETES?
The question occasionally arises as to whether a "nonsolicitation" cove-
nant is governed by the Covenants Not to Compete Act.111 York v. Hair
Club for Men, L.L.C.112 confirms that they are.
In York, two employees of Hair Club for Men (Hair Club) departed its
Houston office to open their own hair-replacement salon a mile away,
evidently violating their two-year, ten-mile radius (in one agreement,
twenty-mile-radius) noncompetition agreement and a nonsolicitation
agreement providing that they would not, during that time, solicit from or
provide any hair-replacement services to Hair Club customers.113 The
trial court found they also violated a nondisclosure agreement by using
the customer information to target and attract forty-one of their former
Hair Club customers.114 The trial court granted a temporary injunction,
though their nonsolicitation agreement to apply only to customers who
had been treated by the local Hair Club in the two years prior to the
employees' departure.1 1 5
Relying on the new Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v.
105. RE/MAX, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
106. Id. at 718-19.




111. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.50-.52 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2009).
112. No. 01-09-00024-CV, 2009 WL 1840813 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 25,
2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).
113. Id. at *1-2.
114. Id. at *2.
115. Id. at *3.
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Fielding1 16 decision, the Houston First Court of Appeals found that Hair
Club did provide the employees with confidential information on its
hard-won clients, that this gave rise to Hair Club's interest in keeping that
information confidential, and that the covenants were designed to en-
force that interest.117 Accordingly, it held both the noncompetition and
the nonsolicitation covenants to be enforceable.118 Whether the employ-
ees used the "lists" of customers or not, they clearly invited their former
Hair Club customers to visit them at the new location, and the court of
appeals held that this violated the nonsolicitation covenant in any
event. 119
The defendants also challenged the trial court's balance of the equities,
urging that the Hair Club could have an adequate remedy at law and that
the harm the defendants would face from these restrictions would far out-
weigh any probable injury to Hair Club. The court of appeals observed
that the employees were licensed cosmetologists and could find work in
cosmetology other than hair replacement. 120 They could also continue to
operate their salon and find new hair-replacement clients other than
those they had served at Hair Club.121 The trial court's order was
affirmed.122
Not addressed in this opinion was how the customers themselves might
feel about it. Hair-replacement services seem to be quite personal in na-
ture, lasting (according to the opinion) some period of years.123 Might
not the goodwill being built up over that time be shared somehow, devel-
oping in a seamless whole, among both the Hair Club institution whose
reputation and advertising had first attracted the customer, and also the
individual cosmetologist who is personally attending to the customer's
needs? Might it be the Hair Club institution which draws the customer in
for the first visit, but the individual cosmetologist who draws him back for
the second?
E. NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
In Information Services Group, Inc. v. Rawlinson,124 the former em-
ployer of Rawlinson, an English citizen and resident, brought suit against
him in Houston for purported breach of several restrictive post-termina-
tion covenants, including a covenant not to compete. When Rawlinson
objected on jurisdictional grounds, the former employer argued that
Rawlinson's execution of employment agreements with a Texas limited
liability company (including restrictive covenants governed by Texas law),
116. 289 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. 2009); see infra Part IV.F.
117. York, 2009 WL 1840813, at *4-5.
118. Id. at *5.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *5-6.
121. Id. at *6.
122. Id.
123. See id. at *1.
124. 302 S.W.3d 392 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
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access to job-related confidential information routed through servers lo-
cated in Texas, and two business trips to Texas for his job, amounted to
minimum contacts. 125 The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied
the customary jurisdictional analysis in concluding that these did not pre-
sent sufficient minimum contacts, 126 but there was a particular twist with
respect to the noncompetition covenant.
In the former employer's view, Rawlinson was contractually prohibited
from competing against it anywhere in the world, including Texas; the
covenants thus "require[d] performance in Texas and so personal jurisdic-
tion is proper here." 127 The court of appeals emphatically disagreed:
[W]e decline to adopt a position that an employee, by agreeing to a
non-compete or non-solicitation agreement, is effectively consenting
to jurisdiction as far-reaching as the scope of the agreement, which in
this case is worldwide. It cannot be enough that Rawlinson simply
agreed not to compete or solicit clients in Texas.128
Of considerable interest in this age where employees can work online
from anywhere-though unnecessary to the decision, since the action was
being dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction-is whether a "world-
wide" restriction would have met the Covenant Not to Compete Act's
requirement that restrictions be reasonable as to geographic scope. 129
F. IMPLIED PROMISES AND "FORCED SALE" PROVISIONS
The roller-coaster ride that is the Texas law of noncompetition cove-
nants took another swerve in Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc.
v. Fielding.130 In 2006 the Texas Supreme Court concluded in Alex
Sheshunoff Management Services, L.P. v. Johnson131 that the statutory
phrase "at the time the agreement is made" should not be read to require
an instantaneous delivery of trade secrets, but instead would permit trade
secrets to be delivered (and accepted by the promisor/employee) gradu-
ally over time. Still, how clearly and definitively an employer must prom-
ise to deliver trade secrets (or other confidential information, or other
value which would give rise to the need for a noncompetition covenant)
remained something of an open issue. In the normal course of business,
many employers would not know exactly what information they would
want to entrust to new employees, or how much, or how quickly. Much
would depend on events and how the employment relationship worked
out. Might an employer hedge its bets, requiring a new hire to hold the
employer's information in confidence and restrict her competition if (and
presumably "to the extent that") the employer came to trust her enough,
125. Id. at 399-400.
126. Id. at 405.
127. Id. at 407.
128. Id.
129. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(a) (Vernon 2009).
130. 289 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. 2009).
131. 209 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. 2006).
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over time, to divulge them? Suppose the employer never expressly prom-
ised to divulge them at all?
That was the situation in Mann Frankfort.132 Mann Frankfort was a
tax, accounting, and consulting firm. Fielding was a new hire, an account-
ant, and a tax professional. When he joined, he signed Mann Frankfort's
standard restrictive covenants, which required him not to compete with
Mann Frankfort after his departure, ostensibly in order to protect its pro-
prietary information. But the agreement did not expressly require Mann
Frankfort to deliver any proprietary information to Fielding at all.1 3 3
The agreement might not have said that in so many words, but the
supreme court concluded that the facts did.134 Fielding was hired to work
as a staff accountant in the firm's tax department. In order to do his job,
he would necessarily have to be given access to client files, client account-
ing information, and other confidential and proprietary information of
the firm. Without them he could not work, or at least could not do the
work he was obviously hired to do. Accordingly, the supreme court held
that an implied promise by the firm (to provide such confidential materi-
als) did exist, and that this was sufficient consideration to make the non-
competition covenant enforceable.' 35 The supreme court realized that
Mann Frankfort's implied promise to give Fielding confidential informa-
tion was "illusory" when it was made, because Mann Frankfort could
have fired him immediately before giving him any confidential informa-
tion.136 However, Mann Frankfort did not fire Fielding first. The su-
preme court concluded that Mann Frankfort "performed its illusory
promise by actually providing confidential information."137
One other aspect of Mann Frankfort which was particularly significant.
It concerned a client purchase provision. The restrictive covenants re-
quired Fielding not to compete, but added a "what if" provision in case
he did. If, within one year after leaving employment, Fielding "directly or
indirectly" performed accounting services for anyone who had been a cli-
ent of Mann Frankfort while he worked there, Fielding would immedi-
ately buy from Mann Frankfort (and Mann Frankfort would immediately
sell to Fielding) "that portion of [Mann Frankfort's] business associated
with [that client]" under terms set out in the agreement.138 Without
much discussion, the supreme court held that this "client purchase provi-
sion was designed to hinder Fielding's ability to use the confidential infor-
mation to compete against Mann Frankfort," and was therefore
"'ancillary to or part of' the otherwise enforceable agreement" at the
132. 289 S.W.3d at 846.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 852.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 851-52.
137. Id. at 852 (citing Sheshunoff, 209 S.W.3d at 651). "[A] unilateral contract formed
when the employer performs a promise that was illusory when made can satisfy the re-
quirements of the [Covenants Not to Compete] Act." Sheshunoff, 209 S.W.3d at 651.
138. Mann Frankfort, 289 S.W.3d at 846.
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time the agreement was made, and thus fully enforceable.139
One might wonder, though, what such a contractual requirement might
mean to a court being asked to enjoin preliminarily the competitive use
of information whose price had thus been liquidated and was indeed re-
quired to be sold to the departing employee. Ordinarily, temporary in-
junctive relief is available only where there is no adequate remedy at
lawl 40-meaning, typically, that an award of money damages would be
difficult to calculate or otherwise inadequate to prevent irreparable harm.
Might such provisions be read as calculating a remedy at law rather pre-
cisely already?
V. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. MIGHT FEES BE FORFEITED? OR MUST THEY BE?
The "departing employee" case of Central Texas Orthopedic Products,
Inc. v. Espinozal41 also raised an issue as to whether a departing em-
ployee might forfeit commissions due but unpaid at the time he left. For-
mer employee Espinoza claimed to be owed over $12,000 in unpaid
commissions, but his former employer claimed Espinoza had breached
his fiduciary duty by disclosing confidential information to a competitor
regarding how much product he was selling, who his customers were, and
the fact that his customers preferred using a certain type of product which
the plaintiff offered but which was not currently offered by the competi-
tor. His former employer also claimed Espinoza tried to convince an-
other employee to leave with him as well. 142 These breaches of fiduciary
duty, the former employer claimed, were sufficient to require Espinoza to
forfeit any remaining claims for compensation.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that "[flee forfeiture is appro-
priate in cases where an employee breaches his fiduciary duty to his em-
ployer," 143 whether or not the breach of fiduciary duty causes any
damages.144 But the court of appeals stopped short of concluding that
the evidence showed Espinoza breached his fiduciary duty as a matter of
law, or even that a breach of fiduciary duty would, necessarily, forfeit that
party's right to earned compensation. Instead, the court of appeals held
that "[bjecause a party's breach of fiduciary duty may forfeit that party's
right to earned compensation," the plaintiff had "raised a genuine issue
of material fact with regard to whether Espinoza breached his fiduciary
duty, and therefore whether [he was] entitled to compensation."1 4 5 The
139. Id. at 852.
140. See Brown v. Gulf Television Co., 157 Tex. 607, 611, 306 S.W.2d 706, 709 (1957).
141. No. 04-09-00148-CV, 2009 WL 4670446 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Dec. 9, 2009,
pet. filed) (mem. op); see also supra Part IV.A.
142. Id. at *5.
143. Id. (citing Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 239 (Tex. 1999)).
144. Id. (citing Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 138 Tex. 565, 572, 160
S.W.2d 509, 513 (1942)).
145. Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
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case was remanded. 146
VI. TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
A. CRAFTING THE INJUNCTION
A common, vexing problem is how to write an enforceable temporary
restraining order or temporary injunction involving lists of customers, se-
cret techniques, or other materials which are confidential. To reveal
these materials by attaching them to orders would expose them to public
view and thus defeat, in many cases, the very point of the orders. Yet
defendants must be given clear and adequate notice of what they are en-
joined from doing, and for orders granting injunctions to be enforceable,
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683 provides that they "shall be specific in
terms" and "shall describe in reasonable detail and not by reference to
the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be
restrained."14 7
This provision was applied in Vaughn v. Intrepid Directional Drilling
Specialists, Ltd.148 Vaughn had been an Intrepid salesman for nine
months when he left and formed his own company. Later he sold his
company back to Intrepid for millions of dollars and a three-year employ-
ment contract containing a noncompetition covenant. The covenant pro-
vided that he would not engage in directional drilling within a five-state
area for four years or solicit directly or indirectly any customers of In-
trepid in that area during that time.149 Vaughn left Intrepid not long af-
terwards, however, and Intrepid filed an action against him, his new
company, and another former employee with a similar agreement. After
a two-day hearing, the trial court entered a temporary injunction.o50
One of the defendants' principal issues on appeal was whether the tem-
porary injunction complied with Rule 683 in being "specific in terms."' 5 '
The order did not identify any of Intrepid's customers within the five-
state area (except for Chesapeake Gas), or all of its employees for that
matter, but rather restrained the defendants from interfering with In-
trepid's customers and business relationships with its customers that were
located within the five-state territory.152
Significantly, however, Vaughn's testimony demonstrated that he knew
"or could easily determine the identity of the other customers."' 53
"Under these circumstances," held the Eastland Court of Appeals, "the
trial court's order sufficiently identified Intrepid's customers for the pur-
146. Id.
147. TEX. R. Civ. P. 683.
148. 288 S.W.3d 931 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2009, no pet.).
149. Id. at 933.
150. Id. at 934.
151. Id. at 938 (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 683).
152. Id. at 938-39.
153. Id. at 939.
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poses of Rule 683."154
Here, the court of appeals concluded that Vaughn's knowledge of his
former employer's customer base would allow him to avoid violating the
temporary injunction, and hence the order complied with Rule 683.155
One wonders whether the result might have been different if specific and
detailed processes had been at issue in the case, or if the information and
materials sought to be protected had been lengthy and detailed.
B. PLEADINGS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND "USE"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated sum-
mary judgment in the Texas trade secret case of Cudd Pressure Control
Inc. v. Roles, because summary judgment had been granted on grounds
that were not pled or argued by the defendants.' 56 Cudd Pressure Con-
trol Inc. (Cudd) is an oilfield services company. Ronnie Roles, Steve
Winters, and four others worked for it until they were enticed by juicy
bonuses to join a newly formed, competing business, Great White Pres-
sure Control LLC (Great White). Cudd became "concerned" about its
ex-employees' mass exodus to a new competitor, so it undertook an in-
vestigation of their pre-departure conduct. Upon discovering security
footage showing Winters loading boxes of materials onto his truck the
night before he quit, and an email from Roles to Great White two months
before he quit asking for a laptop to transfer information, Cudd filed suit,
alleging violations of RICO, conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, misap-
propriation of trade secrets, and common-law unfair competition.' 5 7
The RICO claims were dropped early on, and the case centered on
Cudd's trade secrets misappropriation claims, "focus[ing] on two separate
alleged uses of confidential information: (1) [Roles's] creation of the
Great White business plan using Cudd financial data, and (2) design of a
mini-snubbing unit that Great White purchased from a [third party], but
which was designed, in part," by Winters while he was at Cudd.s58 The
defendants moved for summary judgment on the sole grounds that (1)
they did not use the information they took from Cudd, and (2) Cudd had
no cognizable damages.159 The motion did not discuss whether that infor-
mation constituted trade secrets in the first place. Nonetheless, the dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for the defendants-former
employees on the unpled ground that the disputed information did not
154. Id. (citing Amalgamated Acme Affiliates, Inc. v. Minton, 33 S.W.3d 387, 397-98
(Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (defendant had admitted it could identify the customers
and advertisers that were the subject of the order); Safeguard Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Schaffer,
822 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) ("Orders generally restraining solic-
itation of customers and not specifically listing the individual customers have not been
found to be overbroad.")).
155. Id.
156. 328 F. App'x 961, 965 (5th Cir. 2009).
157. Id. at 962.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 965.
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constitute trade secrets at all. 1 6 0
The Fifth Circuit reversed the summary judgment, holding as a proce-
dural matter that the district court could not grant summary judgment sua
sponte on a ground not requested by the moving party.' 6 ' It then ex-
amined whether summary judgment was proper on the grounds advanced
by the former employees and concluded that it was not.162 Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, the Fifth Circuit
was prepared to assume Cudd's information constituted trade secrets.
Summary judgment could not be sustained on the ground that the former
employees did not "use" the information, because evidence indicated that
they did "use" the information to lure investors and to build a business
plan.163 By "use," the Fifth Circuit meant "commercial use," and it re-
cited its previously derived definitions as "whenever 'a person seeks to
profit from the use of the secret'" and "[a]ny misappropriation ...
followed by an exercise of control and domination."16 5 The evidence
showed at least a fact issue as to whether the defendants' use met that
definition.' 66
Summary judgment based on Cudd's failure to show damages was also
improper, because Cudd had not had sufficient opportunity to gather evi-
dence on that point.167 Thus, the Fifth Circuit vacated the summary judg-
ment award and remanded the case.168
C. ONE BITE, NOT Two
Weddings are big business all over the U.S., but in Texas, where "every-
thing is bigger," the bridal industry wars rival the Great War. This was
the case in Bridal Expo, Inc. v. Van Florestein.169
Bridal Expo is a powerhouse in the industry. For twenty-five years it
has hosted the Bridal Extravaganza Show, one of the largest bridal shows
in the country. The show is attended by hundreds of exhibitors and
thousands of prospective brides who travel from all over Texas to peruse
gowns, floral arrangements, photography, music, catering, and a myriad
of other bridal services, so after twenty-five years, Bridal Expo has ac-




162. Id. at 965-66.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 965 (quoting Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. HAL, Inc., 500 F.3d 444, 450 (5th
Cir. 2007)).
165. Id. at 965-66 (quoting Carbo Ceramics v. Keefe, 166 F. App'x 714, 721 (5th Cir.
2006)).
166. Id. at 966.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 967.
169. No. 4:08-cv-03777, 2009 WL 255862 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2009); see also infra Parts
VII.A, VIII.
170. Id. at *1.
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Defendants Sonja van Florestein and Tiffany Moore left their employ
at Bridal Expo in July 2008, but not before Moore downloaded Bridal
Expo's databases and other information. A few months later, van
Florestein and Moore surfaced, now working for the newly formed com-
pany Wedding Showcase, which scheduled its first "Houston Wedding
Showcase" event for February 2009, a few weeks after the Bridal Extrav-
aganza at the same location.171 They admitted they used the information
they downloaded from Bridal Expo's database to mail ads to vendors for
their new company's seminar, held in November 2008. They also used
Google to advertise their Wedding Showcase as "Houston's #1 Bridal
Show" and mailed a brochure to vendors using "quotations, attributed to
'our' vendors and 'our' brides, that [actually] originated from vendors and
brides at other bridal shows on the East Coast, produced by another
company." 172
In a state court suit, Bridal Expo brought claims for trade secret misap-
propriation, unfair competition, and related business torts. The trial
court denied its request for a temporary restraining order, however, and
also denied its application for a temporary injunction after a hearing.
Bridal Expo decided to cut its losses and nonsuited the state case.173 It
turned around and sued in federal court, asserting the same common-law
claims and requesting the same relief, but adding federal causes of action,
such as a Lanham Act Section 43(a) false advertising claim and a Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act claim.174
On the state claims, the federal district court held that all the elements
of collateral estoppel were present, and it refused to disturb the state
court's ruling on the temporary injunction.175 The district court found no
reason to revisit the state court's decision because only a month had
passed since the state court's denial of preliminary relief, and further-
more, Bridal Expo's February 2009 Bridal Extravaganza, held in the in-
terim, had been successful, thus suggesting a lack of tangible harm to
Bridal Expo.176 What appeared not to be addressed was whether intangi-
ble harm was occurring to Bridal Expo's marks and goodwill, or whether,
regardless of harm to Bridal Expo, the defendants were being unjustly
enriched by their acts.
Also not reported was why the state courts denied Bridal Expo's appli-
cations for interim relief. A hint appears in the federal opinion's discus-
sion of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claims noting that the
defendants had not signed confidentiality or other restrictive agreements
while in the employ of Bridal Expo. 77
171. Id.
172. Id. at *2.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *3.
176. Id. at *5.
177. Id. at *11.
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D. NOT EVERY "STRATEGY" IS A TRADE SECRET
Not every "strategy" is a trade secret, as the Fifth Circuit explained in
CQ, Inc. v. TXU Mining Co., L.P.178 TXU mines lignite (low-grade coal)
for commercial fuel. In 2004, TXU sent a request for bids to CQ and
several other companies that specialized in cleaning lignite to participate
through a "Key Alliance Agreement" in building and operating lignite-
cleaning facilities at two of TXU's lignite mines for five years. TXU re-
quired bidders to sign a "Confidentiality Agreement," preventing either
party from using confidential information disclosed during negotiations
for any purpose, "except the analysis, investigation, and evaluation of the
proposed business relationship."1 7 9
In early 2005, TXU notified CQ that it had been selected as a contrac-
tor. The parties had different understandings, however, of the signifi-
cance of the selection. CO understood that TXU agreed at that point to
the five-year Alliance Agreement discussed in the bid documents, but
TXU contended that it merely selected CQ to continue further negotia-
tions. The parties never came to terms or reduced their agreement to
writing, but CO did spend the next few months advising TXU on the
proposed lignite-cleaning operation. When CO inquired about reducing
the arrangement to writing, TXU responded that it had not made a final
decision, but that it would compensate CO even if it ultimately did not go
forward with the project. TXU ultimately decided against the project,
and in July 2005, TXU terminated its relationship with CO. TXU later
built and operated its own lignite-cleaning facility.180
CO sued TXU for breach of the five-year Alliance Agreement, breach
of the Confidentiality Agreement, quantum meruit, and misappropriation
of trade secrets for using CO's "ROM" strategy to clean lignite. On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found that ques-
tions of material fact precluded summary judgment for CO, but it granted
summary judgment for TXU on breach of the purported Alliance Agree-
ment under the statute of frauds, and on most of the trade secret claims,
on the grounds that CO failed to provide any evidence that TXU used
CQ's confidential information.181 Prior to trial, the district court ex-
cluded the report and opinions of CO's damages expert. The parties then
entered into a settlement agreement whereby TXU paid CO's legal fees,
and CO withdrew its claims for promissory estoppel and injunctive relief.
TXU then moved for a "take-nothing" judgment on CO's remaining
claims.182
CO raised several challenges on appeal, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's judgment and interim rulings, including the exclusion
178. 565 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2009).
179. Id. at 271.
180. Id. at 271-72.




of reports by CQ's damages expert. 83 The Fifth Circuit found CQ's ex-
pert report on lost profits for misappropriation properly excluded as irrel-
evant and untimely; following the initial release of the report, the district
court dismissed CO's contract and trade secret claims that "provided the
substantial basis for the report."8 4 The Fifth Circuit also held that the
district court had properly excluded the expert's supplemental report
based on recovery of a hypothetical royalty under a hypothetical licensing
agreement, as prohibited by Texas law. 85
The Fifth Circuit also upheld the district court's dismissal of CO's trade
secret claims.186 In addition to the lack of evidence that TXU had used
such information, the Fifth Circuit analyzed whether the "ROM" strategy
constituted a trade secret at all. The "ROM" strategy was CQ's recom-
mendation that TXU focus on cleaning lignite at the mine. There were
no allegations that the strategy involved any "previously unknown pro-
cess or method for cleaning lignite."' 87 To the contrary, the evidence sug-
gested that TXU had already contemplated cleaning the lignite when it
sent its original request for bids. The "strategy" was just a recommenda-
tion between two generally known alternatives of how to do it. The Fifth
Circuit reasoned that "[wihile [the] recommendation may have been
based on CO's valuable experience and effort, it was not a 'process or
device for continuous use' that offered TXU an advantage over its com-
petitors," and consequently did not meet the definition of a trade
secret.' 88
E. TRADE SECRETS AND THE AGING PROCESS
Many nondisclosure agreements are open-ended in their terms, requir-
ing the obligees not to use or disclose the information "at any time"; but
many others are expressly limited in time and expire by their own terms
in two, five, ten, or some other term of years. Trade secrets and confiden-
tial information can be protected only so long as their owners take rea-
sonable precautions to protect their confidentiality. What happens when
nondisclosure agreements expire?
This question was addressed and at least partly answered in INEOS
Group Ltd. v. Chevron Phillips Chemical Co.18 9 Here, Chevron Phillips
Chemical (CPChem) obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting INEOS
from soliciting, negotiating, or licensing high-density polyethylene made
by using the "loop slurry" process which CPChem claimed was derived
from its trade secrets. The principal issue on appeal was whether this
technology was still entitled to trade secret protection or whether
183. Id. at 277, 280.
184. Id. at 277.
185. Id. at 278.
186. Id. at 274.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 274-75.
189. No. 01-09-00504-CV, 2009 WL 4854349 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 17,
2009, no pet.).
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CPChem had errantly disclosed it to third parties who were no longer
bound to hold it in confidence. 190
It seems that Phillips's engineers developed the "loop slurry" process
in 1958. Over the following years, the process was further improved and
was licensed out by Phillips and its successors (including CPChem) to
allow other companies to build their own "loop slurry" plants through
over a hundred different licensing agreements. In time, INEOS acquired
the assets of a joint venture which included some of the plants built under
authority of these licenses, together with the related information regard-
ing the "loop slurry" process, and it began licensing the "loop slurry"
technology to third parties. CPChem brought suit against INEOS, claim-
ing misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of contract.191
INEOS defended, in part, by examining exactly how the secrecy of the
"loop slurry" process had been treated since 1958. Its own licensing
agreements with CPChem-or more precisely, the ones to which it had
acceded when it acquired the relevant assets-were perpetual in nature.
But INEOS found several agreements under which Phillips had disclosed
the technology under confidentiality agreements which had long since
expired.' 92
INEOS argued that a "trade secret must be a secret," that "[v]igilance
in guarding the trade secret is required," and that its owner may disclose
it to a third party if it takes steps to insure the secrecy, but that "the
unrestricted disclosure of trade-secret information to third parties,
outside . . . a confidential relationship, destroys the trade-secret status of
the information." 19 3 Most of the license agreements contained "perpet-
ual" secrecy clauses, but INEOS took CPChem to task for a number of
such agreements that had expired by their own terms, such as a 1979
agreement with a fifteen-year term indicating that Phillips had been paid
$1.5 million "specifically for the shortened secrecy term" 19 4 and several
from 1976 with twenty-five-year secrecy terms.195
In INEOS's view, these agreements had clearly expired with the full
knowledge of CPChem's predecessor in interest; hence, the "loop slurry"
technology could no longer enjoy trade secret protection, if it ever had.
CPChem, of course, disagreed, and presented an explanation with respect
to each instance. In one instance of an expired confidentiality agreement,
CPChem explained that the licensee was itself owned by a parent com-
pany bound by a "perpetual" confidentiality requirement. In another,
the licensee had subsequently agreed not to license the technology to
third parties. As to another (with a government ministry in Iraq),
CPChem objected that the time limits should not be deemed to have ever
started running because of force majeure issues with respect to enforce-
190. Id. at *1.
191. Id. at *1-2.
192. Id. at *2.
193. Id. at *7-8.
194. Id. at *5.
195. Id. at *6-7.
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ment inside Iraq. CPChem claimed to have renegotiated other agree-
ments. In any event, CPChem urged that in fact the secrecy had not
really been lost. And it objected that in the 1979 agreement there was no
evidence that the funds were paid "specifically for the shortened secrecy
requirement."' 9 6 (Perhaps the various licensees preferred to keep it to
themselves rather than reveal the technology to others, but if so, the
opinion made no mention of it.)
The issue in INEOS seemed to turn on the exact nature of what
CPChem was required to prove to qualify for a temporary injunction-
which, it appears, is a fairly low threshold. At the temporary injunction
stage, movant CPChem was required only to prove "a probable right of
relief on its misappropriation of trade secrets claim."197 However accu-
rately INEOS may have recited the legal principles applicable to trade
secrets, the Houston First Court of Appeals concluded that it could not
apply them to determine whether the "loop slurry" technology was actu-
ally a trade secret.198 "To the contrary," the court of appeals held, "when
deciding whether to grant trade-secret protection through a temporary
injunction, a trial court does not determine whether the information ...
is, in law and fact, a trade secret; rather, [it merely] determines whether
the [movant has shown it] is entitled to trade secret protection pending
... trial on the merits."1 99
Further, in order to make this showing, all CPChem was required to
show was "some evidence . . . tending to show that it possessed a trade
secret," and more specifically in this case, "some evidence tending to
show [it had been] sufficiently vigilant." 2 9 After noting that it was to
"view[] the evidence ... in the light most favorable to the [trial] court's
ruling, draw[ ] all legitimate inferences [favorable to the trial court's rul-
ing], and defer[] to the trial court's resolution of conflicting evidence,"
the court of appeals had no trouble finding CPChem had presented
"some evidence" of vigilance in maintaining the secrecy of the technol-
ogy. 201 The court of appeals cited to the familiar cases of Rugen v. Inter-
active Business Systems, Inc. 2 0 2 and Gonzales v. Zamora203 for the
proposition that "[w]hen an effort is made to keep material important to
a particular business from competitors, trade secret protection is
warranted. "204
In practical terms, "some evidence" of making "an effort" 205 to main-
tain confidentiality should not be read to minimize the need for secrecy
precautions. Absolute secrecy is not required, but reasonable precau-
196. Id. at *5-9.
197. Id. at *4.
198. Id. at *8.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at *9.
202. 864 S.W.2d 548, 552 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied).
203. 791 S.W.2d 258, 265 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).




tions are,206 and a court can rarely be persuaded to protect property more
strenuously than its owner has protected it. INEOS v. Chevron Phillips
also suggests that confidentiality agreements with term limits might prof-
itably be re-examined and considered from time to time. Two years may
seem like a long time in a fast-moving industry like communications tech-




The Bridal Expo court also addressed the federal claims raised by the
plaintiff, starting with the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits of
its false advertising claim.207
A prima facie case under § 43(a) requires the plaintiff to establish:
(1) the defendant made a false statement of fact about its product;
(2) the statements deceived or had the capacity to deceive a substan-
tial segment of potential customers; (3) the deception is material, in
that it is likely to influence the purchasing decision; (4) ... interstate
commerce [is involved;] and (5) the plaintiff has been . .. injured as a
result.208
If the plaintiff proves the commercial message at issue is "literally false,"
the second and third elements will be presumed.209 Otherwise, the plain-
tiff has to show that the message had a tendency to deceive potential
customers and that it actually affected their purchasing decision. Also,
the statement has to amount to more than "puffery"; in other words, it
must be more than a general statement of opinion or claim of
superiority.210
Defendants called the Google ads puffery and argued that their use of
"our" in the brochures "refer[red] to the principals of Wedding Show-
case, who have produced many shows." Moreover, the brochures said
"several times that the Houston Wedding Showcase is a new show." 211
The district court agreed. Based on the Fifth Circuit's holding in Pizza
Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's International, Inc.,212 the court held that the
Google ads were too ambiguous to be considered literally false, the asser-
tion that the defendant was "#1" was not empirically verifiable, and any-
way, such a statement was the kind of "bald assertion" or "general
206. See In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003) (extent of measures taken to guard
the secrecy of the information is a factor to be considered); see also RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 re-
porter's note cmt. d (1995).
207. Bridal Expo, Inc. v. Van Florestein, No. 4:08-cv-03777, 2009 WL 255862, at *5
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2009); see also supra Part VI.C; infra Part VIII.
208. Bridal Expo, 2009 WL 255862, at *5.
209. Id. at *6.
210. Id. at *6-7.
211. Id. at *6.
212. 227 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2000).
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statement of superiority" on which no reasonable consumer would
rely.2 13 In any event, the defendants stopped running the ad, so injunc-
tive relief was not necessary. 214
As for the brochure, where defendants used the pronoun, "our," to
describe vendors and brides even before they had held their first event,
the court found no literal falsity. "Our" likely referred to the show's
owners, it felt, one of whom ran the shows on the East Coast from which
the "our" statements came. 215 The brochure explained that the Houston
Wedding Showcase would be "a new show . . . with a long history." 216
The court concluded that it was unlikely that a sophisticated vendor audi-
ence, familiar with the Houston wedding market, would be misled into
thinking that the quoted brides and vendors were previously affiliated
with the Wedding Showcase, or that it would affect their decision to at-
tend the defendants' event.217
B. WHO IS THE ADVERTISER? AND WHAT IS AN "ADVERTISEMENT"?
Heartbrand Beef Inc. v. Lobel's of New York, LLC 2 18 illustrates the
occasional difficulty of assessing advertising claims in close competition.
Heartbrand sells Akaushi beef, the South Texas breeder's equivalent to
the very popular and very expensive Japanese Kobe beef. Heartbrand
brought an enforcement action against several defendants, including Ya-
hoo!, for false designation of origin under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act. When a user typed the keyword, "Akaushi," into the Yahoo! search
engine, the first sponsored site that appeared was for the website,
www.akaushisteaks.com. This link contained no actual content but in-
stead was a collection of links. When a user clicked one of the links con-
taining the word, "akaushi," they were directed to lobels.com. Lobel's
sells high-quality beef, but it does not sell Akaushi beef. Heartbrand al-
leged that Yahoo!'s display of the ad constituted common-law unfair
competition 219 and false designation of origin in violation of section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act. 220
The district court recited the elements of a false designation of origin
claim under section 43(a) which are identical to those for false advertis-
ing.221 The court preliminarily acknowledged that Heartbrand's section
43(a) claim against Yahoo! seemed confusing, since "Yahoo! obviously
does not fit into these classic models [of false designation of origin] be-
cause Yahoo! is not in the business of selling beef."222 The court went on
213. Bridal Expo, 2009 WL 255862, at *6-7.
214. Id. at *7.
215. Id. at *8.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. No. V-08-62, 2009 WL 311087 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2009).
219. Id. at *1.
220. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
221. Heartbrand Beef, 2009 WL 311087, at *2; supra Part VII.A (listing the elements);
see Pizza Hut v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2000).
222. Heartbrand Beef, 2009 WL 311087, at *2.
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to analyze the complaint using the section 43(a) elements anyway and
rejected Heartland's claim first, because Yahoo! did not make a "state-
ment" by placing an advertisement-the advertiser made the statement-
and second, even if Yahoo! did make a statement, the statement was not
about Yahoo!'s own products and services. 223 It is not clear what unfair
competition claim remained-since Heartland and Yahoo! weren't com-
petitors-but Yahoo! did not address it in its motion to dismiss.
Use of "keywords" in Internet search engines has led to considerable
dispute for some years now, primarily in the trademark (designation of
origin) context, with some courts holding that "use" of another com-
pany's trademark in metatags or keywords constitutes "use" for purposes
of trademark infringement and others holding that it does not. Geo-
graphic regions known for their production of fine qualities of a certain
product (e.g., Champagne), particularly but not exclusively in Europe,
often claim it is deceptive to use the names of those regions to identify
types of products not sourced from there. In this case, however, the word
"Akaushi" seems not to be used to designate a particular producer, or a
region of the country, but rather a generic type of beef. It would seem,
therefore, that the appropriate section 43(a) analysis would have been
under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B)-the "false advertising" prong-rather
than the § 1125 (a)(1)(A) prong of "false designation of origin." Proba-
bly the court would have arrived at the same conclusion either way, but it
might have had an easier journey and left a clearer trail to follow.
VIII. COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
WHAT IS "AUTHORIZATION"?
In Bridal Expo, the plaintiff also brought claims under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),224 which creates liability for a person who
"knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer
without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such
conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value." 225 To
establish a civil violation, there are extra requirements; here, the relevant
additional factor was "loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period
... aggregating at least $5,000 in value." 226 The term "loss" includes costs
of responding to an offense, such as restoring any information that was
disturbed or interrupted as a result of the offense, and conducting a dam-
age assessment. 227
Bridal Expo claimed its former employees van Florestein and Moore
acted without authorization when they accessed its files on the day they
resigned, after they had turned in theii office keys (and another em-
223. Id. at *2-3.
224. Bridal Expo, Inc. v. Van Florestein, No. 4:08-cv-03777, 2009 WL255862, at *2 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 3, 2009); see also supra Parts VI.C., VII.A (discussing Bridal Expo).
225. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2006) (emphasis added).




ployee had let them back into the office), and that the corresponding loss
plaintiff suffered was its confidential trade secrets. Defendants re-
sponded that there is a marked and significant difference between access
to computers and use or disclosure of information obtained through that
access.228
The district court pointed out a split among the circuits over the mean-
ing of "authorization." Some courts conclude that authorization focuses
on the alleged violator's intent, as when an employee accesses files to use
them in harming the employer, even if the employee technically has au-
thorization to access the files in the scope of her duties. Other courts
have noted that if Congress had intended to include all wrongdoers, it
would have eliminated the "authorization" language. The Fifth Circuit
has not yet ruled on the issue. The district court determined that, given
the statutory construction argument and the rule of lenity (since the
CFAA is also a criminal statute), it would not "equate 'authorization'
with a duty of loyalty to an employer," and thus "authorization" is not
exceeded just because the employee intends to or ultimately does misuse
the acquired information.229
The district court found that van Florestein and Moore had not signed
a confidentiality agreement or any other agreement restricting access to
the files they worked on at Bridal Expo. Further, they accessed the files
on the last day of their employment (even though they had already
turned in their keys), and it was "within the nature of their [employment]
relationship" to use their computers and access the files at issue.230 Thus,
the court held that van Florestein and Moore did not exceed their author-
ization to access the information, and Bridal Expo was unlikely to suc-
ceed on the merits of its CFAA claim. 2 31 Even had there been a
likelihood of success, the court said injunctive relief would not be war-
ranted, based on the Fifth Circuit's hesitance to grant injunctive relief
against the use of information "obtained through a past violation of the
CFAA" where there was no potential for ongoing access.232
This seems to leave the nature of "authority" less than entirely clear. It
is understandable that, based upon an interpretation of less-than-clear
statutory language, the court might not wish to automatically expose the
former employees to a higher degree of culpability than Congress may
have intended. But in this case, it is not readily apparent what "author-
ity"-however it is defined-the former employees might still have to
access their former employer's databases once they had resigned, turned
in their keys, and left the building. Coming back in to retrieve personal
items would be one thing, but coming back in to retrieve information held
in the company's databases would seem to be quite another.
228. Id.
229. Id.






No startling, new principles of competition burst into view this year.
Instead, Texas continued its steady course of common law development
in this area, clarifying points here, reminding practitioners there, address-
ing (among many others) the following:
* Where a product is bad, saying so will rarely be actionable; 233
* "Merger clauses" may forestall fraud claims only where they clearly
anticipate them;2 3 4
* Political subdivisions still enjoy sovereign immunity from tortious
interference claims;2 3 5
* Necessarily implied promises to deliver confidential information
may support a non-competition agreement; 236 and
* "Authorization" under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is less
than certain.237
233. See supra Part I (discussing David Rafes, Inc. v. Huml, No. 01-08-00856-CV, 2009
WL 3491043 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 29, 2009, no pet.)).
234. See supra Part II (discussing LJ Charter, L.L.C. v. Air. Am. Jet Charter, Inc., No.
14-08-00534-CV, 2009 WL 4794242 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 15, 2009, pet.
filed)).
235. See supra Part III.B (discussing City of Houston v. Guthrie, No. 01-08-00712-CV,
2009 WL 5174258 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 31, 2009, no. pet.)).
236. See supra Part IV.F. (discussing Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v.
Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. 2009)).
237. See supra Part VIII (discussing Bridal Expo, Inc. v. Van Florestein, No. 4:08-c-
03777, 2009 WL 255862 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2009)).
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